A decade ago I would have probably disputed the notion that China and the EU will displace the United States in terms of hegemony and otherwise.
Today, however, I concede the possibility, although I must admit the thought of the status quo, stretching from the 1950s to the 1990s, of the USA as being one of the dominant nations, changing to something else is a bit unsettling.
As for the US economy, from the 1950s to the 1970s it can be argued that it 'delivered the goods', in that broadened prosperity was a real thing and not an illusory phenomenon. The Gini index of inequality dropped all those years until it bottomed out in the late 1960s, to cite one example. Or, to cite James Galbraith, the economic expansion of the 1960s was "far stronger and more enduring" than any since. Political conservatives like to deride it as being a 'wartime' expansion, which is amusing since there was never a formal declaration of war against Vietnam, and in general they are quite complicit in the national amnesia regarding just how badly they screwed up that portion of Asia; in doing so it allows them to regale Ronald Reagan, who, until 1999, presided over the 'longest peacetime expansion', although Bill Clinton takes that title for the expansion of the 1990s. Suck eggs, Republicans. ;)
Anyway, getting back to the central area of debate, the US economy has been weakening since 1973 (this demarcation point is visible on a lot of graphs that chart US economic statistics. One very telling one is a plot of productivity and real family income. There is a sharp breakpoint at 1973), and this has been reflected in the usual symptoms associated with decline of other hegemonic countries (in this, I am borrowing heavily from Kevin Phillips, who wrote American Theocracy, among other books) - rising crime rates, a slowing economy, an increasingly ineffective central government, the rise of religious fundamentalism, and a persistent disconnect between reality and perception among the home country's populace (such as the blatantly obvious belief among the majority of Americans that their country is sui generis, and special among other nations that inevitably, to a Canadian, brings up uncomfortable echoes of the doctrine of Manifest Destiny).
The United States, for all that it is allegedly a 'beacon' to the world, rests its power more and more on excessive military strength and less and less on a viable, diverse economy that produces real goods and delivers real results for the ordinary man or woman.
Alvin Toffler in Powershift used the analogy that power can be analyzed like a three-legged stool: when all the legs are equally effective the chair is the most stable. He uses three degrees of power, in terms of violence, knowledge, and wealth. When a nation can effectively make use of all three, it is the best positioned to take advantage of changes in the distribution of power across the globe.
In 1990, when he wrote the book, the USA still seemed to fit the bill as being the most 'balanced' - having a strong military, a decent economy (albeit growing at about 2.5% per year instead of 4% per year, but anyway...), and a good post-secondary education system.
At the time, Europe seemed to be too weak militarily to project its power beyond the immediate realm of western Europe, and Japan seemed to be too focussed on knowledge-power, so that the EEC (as it was known then) or Japan could not effectively replace the USA in a power vacuum. Signs existed that the Soviet Union was far too stagnant to effectively replace the USA, so Toffler didn't spend much time on that nation.
Today, however, swapping China for Japan and regarding the EU in a new light, wealth-power and knowledge-power continue to suit the EU well, and in addition the various nations' military forces within the EU are, I think, on the whole, better suited to meet world problems than they were a decade or more ago. As for China, knowledge-power is growing within that nation, and wealth-power will follow. Militarily it is likely capable of projecting that power within the local Asian theater, which is all I think it really needs at the moment, since economically, the USA is far too dependent on China for a war to be considered a good idea.
Meanwhile, as I said the USA has been resting more of its power on violence (military power) and wealth (economic power) than on knowledge (educational levels of the population). Even its wealth (economic power) may be more tenuous than we like to think, so it stands to reason that it is becoming less well-positioned than in years past to deal with sudden changes in the power distribution of the world.
A decade ago I would have probably disputed the notion that China and the EU will displace the United States in terms of hegemony and otherwise.
Today, however, I concede the possibility, although I must admit the thought of the status quo, stretching from the 1950s to the 1990s, of the USA as being one of the dominant nations, changing to something else is a bit unsettling.
As for the US economy, from the 1950s to the 1970s it can be argued that it 'delivered the goods', in that broadened prosperity was a real thing and not an illusory phenomenon. The Gini index of inequality dropped all those years until it bottomed out in the late 1960s, to cite one example. Or, to cite James Galbraith, the economic expansion of the 1960s was "far stronger and more enduring" than any since. Political conservatives like to deride it as being a 'wartime' expansion, which is amusing since there was never a formal declaration of war against Vietnam, and in general they are quite complicit in the national amnesia regarding just how badly they screwed up that portion of Asia; in doing so it allows them to regale Ronald Reagan, who, until 1999, presided over the 'longest peacetime expansion', although Bill Clinton takes that title for the expansion of the 1990s. Suck eggs, Republicans. ;)
Many people forget Clinton's role in the bombings of what was Yugoslavia. His reputation is far from immaculate.
NukeChem;14148 said:
Anyway, getting back to the central area of debate, the US economy has been weakening since 1973 (this demarcation point is visible on a lot of graphs that chart US economic statistics. One very telling one is a plot of productivity and real family income. There is a sharp breakpoint at 1973), and this has been reflected in the usual symptoms associated with decline of other hegemonic countries (in this, I am borrowing heavily from Kevin Phillips, who wrote American Theocracy, among other books) - rising crime rates, a slowing economy, an increasingly ineffective central government, the rise of religious fundamentalism, and a persistent disconnect between reality and perception among the home country's populace (such as the blatantly obvious belief among the majority of Americans that their country is sui generis, and special among other nations that inevitably, to a Canadian, brings up uncomfortable echoes of the doctrine of Manifest Destiny).
Whether the US economy is slowing consderably is debatable. Its GDP is higher than ever (or any nation's) and contiues to grow at a reasonable rate. The US unemployment rate is also fairly low. Rising crime (that is also debatable, as in some parts of the country, the crime rate has been dropping since the mid 90s) is more an indicator of the polarization of wealth as opposed to a weakening economy.
The government may be somewhat ineffective, but in a fairly free economy such as that of the US, does that really matter? That is what makes the economy so wonderful: it continues to grow no matter who is in power.
Religioius fundamentalism is locational. Certainly it exists in the Bible Belt of the US but I doubt that with ever-rising immigration, religious fundamentalism is an issue. Again, religious fundamentalism may be only marginally related to economic growth.
As for the nation being perceived as sui generis by its populace, wasn't that always the case with the US? Again, however, the nation is tremendously diverse, so to say that all Americans have their heads up their arse would be a statement of little validity.
NukeChem;14148 said:
The United States, for all that it is allegedly a 'beacon' to the world, rests its power more and more on excessive military strength and less and less on a viable, diverse economy that produces real goods and delivers real results for the ordinary man or woman.
A crucial point and it's good that you see it. The fact of the matter is that the majority (I'm thinking 70% to 80%) of the US economy is driven by services. These are intangible products for which people pay money: I don't mean just having a hamburger made for waiting in a fast-food line, it could also be all sorts of services related to things such as entertainment, retail, leisure, transportation, and restaurants to name a few. Another term for this is the tertiary sector of economic activity. The higher a nation's economy is attributable to the tertiary sector, the more better that nation's economy. At this point, I'd say China's tertiary sector is at most 35% to 40% a far cry from the US. It is considered better to have your economy rooted in the tertiary sector because essentially, you put in little cost to produce something. You don't have to pay for it to be stored or transported and perishability is never an issue. Hence, to say that the nation relies less on the production of real goods is absolutely right, but that's a good thing.
NukeChem;14148 said:
Alvin Toffler in Powershift used the analogy that power can be analyzed like a three-legged stool: when all the legs are equally effective the chair is the most stable. He uses three degrees of power, in terms of violence, knowledge, and wealth. When a nation can effectively make use of all three, it is the best positioned to take advantage of changes in the distribution of power across the globe.
In 1990, when he wrote the book, the USA still seemed to fit the bill as being the most 'balanced' - having a strong military, a decent economy (albeit growing at about 2.5% per year instead of 4% per year, but anyway...), and a good post-secondary education system.
At the time, Europe seemed to be too weak militarily to project its power beyond the immediate realm of western Europe, and Japan seemed to be too focussed on knowledge-power, so that the EEC (as it was known then) or Japan could not effectively replace the USA in a power vacuum. Signs existed that the Soviet Union was far too stagnant to effectively replace the USA, so Toffler didn't spend much time on that nation.
Today, however, swapping China for Japan and regarding the EU in a new light, wealth-power and knowledge-power continue to suit the EU well, and in addition the various nations' military forces within the EU are, I think, on the whole, better suited to meet world problems than they were a decade or more ago. As for China, knowledge-power is growing within that nation, and wealth-power will follow. Militarily it is likely capable of projecting that power within the local Asian theater, which is all I think it really needs at the moment, since economically, the USA is far too dependent on China for a war to be considered a good idea.
China is also dependent on the US: if there is less demand for Chinese products, its economy will diminish. Many underestimate the degree to which China is dependent on the US (I admit, however, that it is valid to say that the US is very dependent on China).
NukeChem;14148 said:
Meanwhile, as I said the USA has been resting more of its power on violence (military power) and wealth (economic power) than on knowledge (educational levels of the population). Even its wealth (economic power) may be more tenuous than we like to think, so it stands to reason that it is becoming less well-positioned than in years past to deal with sudden changes in the power distribution of the world.
American post-secondary institutions are said to be the best in the world. This simply stems from the economy, as does the military. To equate knowledge, economy, and military as equal is falacious: for in my opinion, having a strong economy will usually ensure both a decent military and a good knowledge base.
True, China is catching up to the US. However, who benefits from it? Not the ordinary Chinese (unless they're living in Hong Kong). The nation's GDP per capita is quite a distance away from the America's; this fact usually translates as fewer people benefitting from a fast growing economy.
China is growing, but it will take some time for it to outgrow the US in absolute terms (GDP) and even more time for it to outgrow the US in relative terms (GDP per capita).
The biggest concerns for the US are its debts to China and high national debt. I doubt, however, that such a situation will change the US economy overnight.
Whether the US economy is slowing consderably is debatable. Its GDP is higher than ever (or any nation's) and contiues to grow at a reasonable rate. The US unemployment rate is also fairly low. Rising crime (that is also debatable, as in some parts of the country, the crime rate has been dropping since the mid 90s) is more an indicator of the polarization of wealth as opposed to a weakening economy.
GDP (national production of goods and services) by itself is a false metric. It's an aggregate indicator that takes no account of the composition thereof. In the 1950s and 1960s, the composition of GDP was composed largely of manufacturing and rather little in services. The financial sector was also quite small and focussed on the 'basics' - savings, loans, that sort of thing. Today the USA's GDP is composed to a far greater degree of services, particularly the financial, as well as ongoing home construction.
From the 1950s to the end of the 1960s, the USA's economy grew, in general, at about 4% per year. Since the 1970s the rate has dropped to around 3% per year. One percentage point may not make a lot of difference on an exam, but it adds up over time in an economy, since in a relatively unregulated economy, growth purely for its own sake is one of the few levers by which prosperity 'trickles down' to the masses.
The government may be somewhat ineffective, but in a fairly free economy such as that of the US, does that really matter? That is what makes the economy so wonderful: it continues to grow no matter who is in power.
Corollary to my above statement: High levels of wealth inequality tend, at best, to provoke frequent recessions. At worst, revolutions.
From 1950 to 1973, there was perhaps one or two years in that entire period for which growth in inflation-adjusted GDP was negative.
Since then, there has been, on average, one recession per decade (and we're not talking minor ones - we're talking bruising, nasty ones - the 1982 one was considered the worst since the Depression, and the one in the early 1990s was no picnic either). The 2000-2001 'recession' is only not one by the very skin of its teeth - I would call zero net growth a recession qualifier, since you can play games with how the quarterly GDP growth data are reported to change negative yearly growth into net zero, and by the NBER's definition that's not technically a recession.
The policy choices of the US's government have generated a situation where economic growth continues, but yields less and less for the average working USian.
eligioius fundamentalism is locational. Certainly it exists in the Bible Belt of the US but I doubt that with ever-rising immigration, religious fundamentalism is an issue. Again, religious fundamentalism may be only marginally related to economic growth.
Not if fundamentalism directly impacts the knowledge sector.
Which it is doing by maneuvering extremists onto school councils, and into state governments, which control a lot of the educational levers in the USA. In doing so they are hobbling the K-12 system, and this will have long-term impacts on the post-secondary system, which, by dint of sheer numbers, is why the USA's is considered one of the best. Where else in the world can you count ten universities just in the top tier? Canada alone has only about fifteen total - the US has innumerable state universities, if a student isn't absolutely keen on MIT or Harvard.
As for the nation being perceived as sui generis by its populace, wasn't that always the case with the US? Again, however, the nation is tremendously diverse, so to say that all Americans have their heads up their arse would be a statement of little validity.
It is of particular relevance in a world in which the dominant theme is that we live in a global(ized) village. This parochial, insular, narrow-minded nation is the World's Only Superpower, and it is on the basis of a wide swath of ignorance about the world that the US government and its electorate make decisions that affect this planet.
There is a very nasty under-sewer in the United States in particular, which you can probe on its Internet forums and chat lines. You will invariably see even moderately liberal Americans make the most astonishingly ignorant and arrogant comments about Canada, never mind Europe. You will see the n-word bandied about to the point where it will rapidly be no surprise as to why race relations have gone in reverse, not forward, in that country.
Let me tell you another story.
In 1996, the first time I ever drove down to the USA... was going to meet a buddy in Seattle. Being that this was my first time, I was very curious about Washington State, which is geographically a lot like BC. Well, the absolute shock - I really do mean it was a shock to me - was that when I drove the I-5, major sections of it drove like I was in a pickup truck on a logging road.
The wealthiest nation in the world, the most car-crazy nation in the world, can't be bothered to pave its own roads properly.
Ditto this when I went to Oregon. Ditto this in California. Ditto this in Arizona. Time and time again I saw the most slapdash, penny-pinching, cheap-bastard road maintenance that could be deemed humanly possible.
This is a country whose government, without even sneezing, can blow $20 billion and not even miss it. For comparison, BC's government's entire budget is $35 billion today and was about $25 billion in the 1990s.
It became rapidly clear to me in a number of other ways as well that the United States has is priorities seriously wrong in some fundamental respects.
A crucial point and it's good that you see it. The fact of the matter is that the majority (I'm thinking 70% to 80%) of the US economy is driven by services. These are intangible products for which people pay money: I don't mean just having a hamburger made for waiting in a fast-food line, it could also be all sorts of services related to things such as entertainment, retail, leisure, transportation, and restaurants to name a few. Another term for this is the tertiary sector of economic activity. The higher a nation's economy is attributable to the tertiary sector, the more better that nation's economy. At this point, I'd say China's tertiary sector is at most 35% to 40% a far cry from the US. It is considered better to have your economy rooted in the tertiary sector because essentially, you put in little cost to produce something. You don't have to pay for it to be stored or transported and perishability is never an issue. Hence, to say that the nation relies less on the production of real goods is absolutely right, but that's a good thing.
It isn't.
Services includes the financial sector, whose 'paper economy' is partially disconnected from the 'real economy', so to the extent that financial services take away from the real economy, it's a net loss.
Furthermore, in manufacturing and construction, worker productivity is easily improved by simple mechanization. Want a job done faster? Throw a machine at it. Boom, the same $25 an hour worker just doubled his output. More profit, more wages, everybody wins.
You can't do that in services, and boy howdy, do they try anyway. Ever wondered why 'combo meals by number' became so popular in fast food restaurants in the 1990s? It was one way some genius figured out how to boost productivity by boosting the rate of output. The faster you can process orders the more you can sell in an hour.
This is also why the gap between wages and productivity has been increasing since 1973, particularly for the USA. As the service sector expands, overall productivity drops. As productivity drops, so does overall output per worker. As overall output per worker drops, GDP growth begins to sag.
The way out for companies, is to pay less to their workers. In Canada and Europe this has been manifested in higher unemployment than in past decades as we tolerate this by maintaining the welfare state. In the USA this has been manifested in sagging inflation-adjusted wages.
Neither is a viable long-term solution.
True, China is catching up to the US. However, who benefits from it? Not the ordinary Chinese (unless they're living in Hong Kong). The nation's GDP per capita is quite a distance away from the America's; this fact usually translates as fewer people benefitting from a fast growing economy.
China is growing, but it will take some time for it to outgrow the US in absolute terms (GDP) and even more time for it to outgrow the US in relative terms (GDP per capita).
The biggest concerns for the US are its debts to China and high national debt. I doubt, however, that such a situation will change the US economy overnight.
Inequality in China has actually been proving to be an ideological headache as the government is still nominally 'socialist'. China's politico-economic ideology can best be described as a very unusual hybrid of authoritarianism and capitalism.
"Overnight?" No, I agree.
But trends are things of decades and it is clear, in hindsight, that the trends that were just beginning to manifest in the 1990s are becoming more evident with time, and those trends basically indicate (Finlayson, Naming Rumpelstiltskin) that "the USA will fit every definition of a third world country by 2020".
Comments
A decade ago I would have probably disputed the notion that China and the EU will displace the United States in terms of hegemony and otherwise.
Today, however, I concede the possibility, although I must admit the thought of the status quo, stretching from the 1950s to the 1990s, of the USA as being one of the dominant nations, changing to something else is a bit unsettling.
As for the US economy, from the 1950s to the 1970s it can be argued that it 'delivered the goods', in that broadened prosperity was a real thing and not an illusory phenomenon. The Gini index of inequality dropped all those years until it bottomed out in the late 1960s, to cite one example. Or, to cite James Galbraith, the economic expansion of the 1960s was "far stronger and more enduring" than any since. Political conservatives like to deride it as being a 'wartime' expansion, which is amusing since there was never a formal declaration of war against Vietnam, and in general they are quite complicit in the national amnesia regarding just how badly they screwed up that portion of Asia; in doing so it allows them to regale Ronald Reagan, who, until 1999, presided over the 'longest peacetime expansion', although Bill Clinton takes that title for the expansion of the 1990s. Suck eggs, Republicans. ;)
Anyway, getting back to the central area of debate, the US economy has been weakening since 1973 (this demarcation point is visible on a lot of graphs that chart US economic statistics. One very telling one is a plot of productivity and real family income. There is a sharp breakpoint at 1973), and this has been reflected in the usual symptoms associated with decline of other hegemonic countries (in this, I am borrowing heavily from Kevin Phillips, who wrote American Theocracy, among other books) - rising crime rates, a slowing economy, an increasingly ineffective central government, the rise of religious fundamentalism, and a persistent disconnect between reality and perception among the home country's populace (such as the blatantly obvious belief among the majority of Americans that their country is sui generis, and special among other nations that inevitably, to a Canadian, brings up uncomfortable echoes of the doctrine of Manifest Destiny).
The United States, for all that it is allegedly a 'beacon' to the world, rests its power more and more on excessive military strength and less and less on a viable, diverse economy that produces real goods and delivers real results for the ordinary man or woman.
Alvin Toffler in Powershift used the analogy that power can be analyzed like a three-legged stool: when all the legs are equally effective the chair is the most stable. He uses three degrees of power, in terms of violence, knowledge, and wealth. When a nation can effectively make use of all three, it is the best positioned to take advantage of changes in the distribution of power across the globe.
In 1990, when he wrote the book, the USA still seemed to fit the bill as being the most 'balanced' - having a strong military, a decent economy (albeit growing at about 2.5% per year instead of 4% per year, but anyway...), and a good post-secondary education system.
At the time, Europe seemed to be too weak militarily to project its power beyond the immediate realm of western Europe, and Japan seemed to be too focussed on knowledge-power, so that the EEC (as it was known then) or Japan could not effectively replace the USA in a power vacuum. Signs existed that the Soviet Union was far too stagnant to effectively replace the USA, so Toffler didn't spend much time on that nation.
Today, however, swapping China for Japan and regarding the EU in a new light, wealth-power and knowledge-power continue to suit the EU well, and in addition the various nations' military forces within the EU are, I think, on the whole, better suited to meet world problems than they were a decade or more ago. As for China, knowledge-power is growing within that nation, and wealth-power will follow. Militarily it is likely capable of projecting that power within the local Asian theater, which is all I think it really needs at the moment, since economically, the USA is far too dependent on China for a war to be considered a good idea.
Meanwhile, as I said the USA has been resting more of its power on violence (military power) and wealth (economic power) than on knowledge (educational levels of the population). Even its wealth (economic power) may be more tenuous than we like to think, so it stands to reason that it is becoming less well-positioned than in years past to deal with sudden changes in the power distribution of the world.
The government may be somewhat ineffective, but in a fairly free economy such as that of the US, does that really matter? That is what makes the economy so wonderful: it continues to grow no matter who is in power.
Religioius fundamentalism is locational. Certainly it exists in the Bible Belt of the US but I doubt that with ever-rising immigration, religious fundamentalism is an issue. Again, religious fundamentalism may be only marginally related to economic growth.
As for the nation being perceived as sui generis by its populace, wasn't that always the case with the US? Again, however, the nation is tremendously diverse, so to say that all Americans have their heads up their arse would be a statement of little validity. A crucial point and it's good that you see it. The fact of the matter is that the majority (I'm thinking 70% to 80%) of the US economy is driven by services. These are intangible products for which people pay money: I don't mean just having a hamburger made for waiting in a fast-food line, it could also be all sorts of services related to things such as entertainment, retail, leisure, transportation, and restaurants to name a few. Another term for this is the tertiary sector of economic activity. The higher a nation's economy is attributable to the tertiary sector, the more better that nation's economy. At this point, I'd say China's tertiary sector is at most 35% to 40% a far cry from the US. It is considered better to have your economy rooted in the tertiary sector because essentially, you put in little cost to produce something. You don't have to pay for it to be stored or transported and perishability is never an issue. Hence, to say that the nation relies less on the production of real goods is absolutely right, but that's a good thing. China is also dependent on the US: if there is less demand for Chinese products, its economy will diminish. Many underestimate the degree to which China is dependent on the US (I admit, however, that it is valid to say that the US is very dependent on China). American post-secondary institutions are said to be the best in the world. This simply stems from the economy, as does the military. To equate knowledge, economy, and military as equal is falacious: for in my opinion, having a strong economy will usually ensure both a decent military and a good knowledge base.
True, China is catching up to the US. However, who benefits from it? Not the ordinary Chinese (unless they're living in Hong Kong). The nation's GDP per capita is quite a distance away from the America's; this fact usually translates as fewer people benefitting from a fast growing economy.
China is growing, but it will take some time for it to outgrow the US in absolute terms (GDP) and even more time for it to outgrow the US in relative terms (GDP per capita).
The biggest concerns for the US are its debts to China and high national debt. I doubt, however, that such a situation will change the US economy overnight.
From the 1950s to the end of the 1960s, the USA's economy grew, in general, at about 4% per year. Since the 1970s the rate has dropped to around 3% per year. One percentage point may not make a lot of difference on an exam, but it adds up over time in an economy, since in a relatively unregulated economy, growth purely for its own sake is one of the few levers by which prosperity 'trickles down' to the masses. Corollary to my above statement: High levels of wealth inequality tend, at best, to provoke frequent recessions. At worst, revolutions.
From 1950 to 1973, there was perhaps one or two years in that entire period for which growth in inflation-adjusted GDP was negative.
Since then, there has been, on average, one recession per decade (and we're not talking minor ones - we're talking bruising, nasty ones - the 1982 one was considered the worst since the Depression, and the one in the early 1990s was no picnic either). The 2000-2001 'recession' is only not one by the very skin of its teeth - I would call zero net growth a recession qualifier, since you can play games with how the quarterly GDP growth data are reported to change negative yearly growth into net zero, and by the NBER's definition that's not technically a recession.
The policy choices of the US's government have generated a situation where economic growth continues, but yields less and less for the average working USian.
Not if fundamentalism directly impacts the knowledge sector.
Which it is doing by maneuvering extremists onto school councils, and into state governments, which control a lot of the educational levers in the USA. In doing so they are hobbling the K-12 system, and this will have long-term impacts on the post-secondary system, which, by dint of sheer numbers, is why the USA's is considered one of the best. Where else in the world can you count ten universities just in the top tier? Canada alone has only about fifteen total - the US has innumerable state universities, if a student isn't absolutely keen on MIT or Harvard. It is of particular relevance in a world in which the dominant theme is that we live in a global(ized) village. This parochial, insular, narrow-minded nation is the World's Only Superpower, and it is on the basis of a wide swath of ignorance about the world that the US government and its electorate make decisions that affect this planet.
There is a very nasty under-sewer in the United States in particular, which you can probe on its Internet forums and chat lines. You will invariably see even moderately liberal Americans make the most astonishingly ignorant and arrogant comments about Canada, never mind Europe. You will see the n-word bandied about to the point where it will rapidly be no surprise as to why race relations have gone in reverse, not forward, in that country.
Let me tell you another story.
In 1996, the first time I ever drove down to the USA... was going to meet a buddy in Seattle. Being that this was my first time, I was very curious about Washington State, which is geographically a lot like BC. Well, the absolute shock - I really do mean it was a shock to me - was that when I drove the I-5, major sections of it drove like I was in a pickup truck on a logging road.
The wealthiest nation in the world, the most car-crazy nation in the world, can't be bothered to pave its own roads properly.
Ditto this when I went to Oregon. Ditto this in California. Ditto this in Arizona. Time and time again I saw the most slapdash, penny-pinching, cheap-bastard road maintenance that could be deemed humanly possible.
This is a country whose government, without even sneezing, can blow $20 billion and not even miss it. For comparison, BC's government's entire budget is $35 billion today and was about $25 billion in the 1990s.
It became rapidly clear to me in a number of other ways as well that the United States has is priorities seriously wrong in some fundamental respects. It isn't.
Services includes the financial sector, whose 'paper economy' is partially disconnected from the 'real economy', so to the extent that financial services take away from the real economy, it's a net loss.
Furthermore, in manufacturing and construction, worker productivity is easily improved by simple mechanization. Want a job done faster? Throw a machine at it. Boom, the same $25 an hour worker just doubled his output. More profit, more wages, everybody wins.
You can't do that in services, and boy howdy, do they try anyway. Ever wondered why 'combo meals by number' became so popular in fast food restaurants in the 1990s? It was one way some genius figured out how to boost productivity by boosting the rate of output. The faster you can process orders the more you can sell in an hour.
This is also why the gap between wages and productivity has been increasing since 1973, particularly for the USA. As the service sector expands, overall productivity drops. As productivity drops, so does overall output per worker. As overall output per worker drops, GDP growth begins to sag.
The way out for companies, is to pay less to their workers. In Canada and Europe this has been manifested in higher unemployment than in past decades as we tolerate this by maintaining the welfare state. In the USA this has been manifested in sagging inflation-adjusted wages.
Neither is a viable long-term solution. Inequality in China has actually been proving to be an ideological headache as the government is still nominally 'socialist'. China's politico-economic ideology can best be described as a very unusual hybrid of authoritarianism and capitalism.
"Overnight?" No, I agree.
But trends are things of decades and it is clear, in hindsight, that the trends that were just beginning to manifest in the 1990s are becoming more evident with time, and those trends basically indicate (Finlayson, Naming Rumpelstiltskin) that "the USA will fit every definition of a third world country by 2020".
*gets feedback*
Anyone reading this? :tongue: